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2Globalisation is an essentially contested concept.   Some analysts would argue that all we are
experiencing at the beginning of the 21st century is an accelerated form of internationalisation;
others would argue that there is something we can call ‘globalisation’, but it is a malign force
which requires organised political resistance.
I am increasingly reminded of the debate over corp ratism which took place in the 1970s and
1980s.   The debate was bedevilled by disagreements between those who wanted to use
corporatism simply as an analytical concept to help to understand certain changes that
appeared to taking place in national political economies; and those who wanted to prescribe
corporatism as an appropriate way of running the Keynesian welfare state.   Similar tensions
between analysis and prescription characterise the debate on globalisation.
There was also little agreement on a definition of corp ratism which made the conduct of the
debate very difficult.  Such a lack of agreement on definition is also a problem in the debate on
globalisation.  By the time some of these issues had started to be resolved, the phenomenon of
corporatism had started to decline in importance at a macro level and analysts were forced
back to a debate about whether it was to be found in the dairy industry.   Such an outcome
seems less likely in the case of globalisation (both the general disappear nce of the
phenomenon and its survival in the special conditions of the cowshed).   While it is not an
irreversible process, it is driven by an economic dyna ic which has considerable momentum
behind it, even if forms of political resistance are on the increase.
3Beneath the Valley of the hyper globalists
The time has come to set out my stall, as Alan Curbishley would say.  My general position is
that something is happening which does represent a step change in the international political
economy.    However, one must be careful of a new form of deter inism which sees
globalisation as a kind of flood sweeping along and obliterating all distinctive national
structures in its path.  Globalisation can be politically mediated, although whether that is more
possible at a regional than a national level is an interesting research question.
Let me try and put the question of definition to one side.   Political scientists with a definition
are like dogs with a bone: they will continue to gnaw at it while ignoring more nutritious
alternatives.    In very general terms, the processes underlying globalisation may be described
as follows: trade grows faster than output; foreign direct investment grows faster than trade;
international financial transfers grow much faster than foreign direct investment.   Driving all
these processes are the activities of multinational companies, some of which have the
characteristics of emergent ‘stateless firms’.  (Grant, 1997).    One might argue that these
processes could just as well be described as internationalisation.  (For a useful typology which
places internationalization and globalization as end points on a spectrum, see Goodman, 1997,
p.670).     I do not want to press the point too much: the argument in the second half of this
paper could stand if one rejects the G word.  Indeed, it could stand if one want to describe the
phenomena being analysed as ‘blancmange’ or any other suitably neutral term.  Let us not let
terminology stand in the way of our exploration of processes.    Whether one refers to the
linesman as a  ‘lino’ or an assistant referee does not alter the fact that he is visually challenged.
Globalisation may be understood as a continuing and dynamic process which reduces the
significance of national boundaries (and hence the autonomy of nation-states as economic
4policy actors) as impediments to the free movement of (above all) capital, goods, services (and
to a much lesser extent) labour.   It is a highly complex phenomenon which does not
necessarily produce political convergence.  (Wincott,  2000).
Higgott  (1998, p.6) distinguishes four broad approaches to globalisation.  Let us set to one
side the argument that globalisation relates to a specific historical epoch, and that the current
phenomenon is little different from the pre-1914 international economy.   Let us also set to
one side, important though it is, the argument that gloablization is a technological and social
revolution (while reminding ourselves that technological revolutions are invariably socially
mediated).   We are then left with two approaches.
The first sees globalisation as a confluence of economic phenomena ‘especially the
liberalisation and deregulation of markets, privatisation of assets, retreat of state welfare
functions, diffusion of technology, cross-national distribution of production and foreign direct
investment, and the integration of capital markets.’  (Higgott, 1998, p.6).   This rather
deterministic version of globalisation can be interpreted as ‘simply the latest - triumphalist -
version of neo-liberalism’ (Wincott, 2000, p.174).  Social democrats find it particularly
provoking.   Nevertheless, it does capture at least a partial reality.   It is interesting to note
that Germany, the bastion of the organised market economy approach, is being breached by
the onslaughts of globalisation.  The successful acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone has
at least symbolic importance,
Another version of globalisation is to see it ‘as the hegemony of American values’.  (Higgott,
1998, p.6).   As Strange comments, ‘All too often, [globalisation] is a polite euphemism for
the continuing Americanisation of consumer tastes and cultural practices.’   (Strange, 1996,
5p.xiii).   One does not have to quote statistics to appreciate the current strength of the
American economy.   It is also one of the sources of the vulnerability of globalisation: a
serious setback for the American economy would have global repercussions and what seemed
to be an irreversible process might be brought to a halt.   There are a number of possible
futures.
It is also important, however, to be aware of the extent to which the European and North
American economies are increasingly becoming integrated, despite the recurrent flare ups of
trade tensions, usually over agricultural issues.    There is a sense in which if globalisation
means anything it is the dominance of the global economy by the US and the EU which
between them account for around half of world GDP and global trade.   Foreign direct
investment  (FDI) between the two domains is increasing rapidly.  ‘In 1996 about 50 per cent
of the US foreign direct investment position was in the EU, and almost 60 per cent of EU
foreign direct investment was in the USA.’  (Blank and Taillandier,  1998, p.12).  Recent
figures suggest a further acceleration of two-way FDI.
In this paper there will be a particular emphasis on the way in which globalisation calls f rth
new political arrangements and structures.   Note, for example, the Disputes Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organisation which impinges on the sovereignty of
signatory states.   A country like the United States could, of course, decide that the DSM was
an unacceptable price to pay for freer trade.   Moves towards less managed trade have already
been frustrated by the events in Seattle (as much as by poor preparation by the participants as
by the events on the streets).   Trade has become one of the main sites of political resistance to
globalisation, but it is an arena in which one could argue that all that is occurring is
6internationalisation and that the most important processes associated with globalisation are
less visible than the WTO.
The WTO is a good target for opponents of globalisation, and they may be able to win
significant victories in areas such as food safety, but less institutionalised settings may be
where the real dynamic of globalisation is to be found and where imbalances such as those
between north and south are perpetuated.
Even so, globalisation cannot be a purely economic process.   New political structures are
involved, whether their role is to facilitate globalisation or to check it. One example referred to
later in the paper is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue which forms part of the EU-US
summit process which may be seen as a mechanism for managing differences between the two
largest political domains involved in the globalisation process.
Identifying and analysing such structures still leaves open the question of what role remains for
the nation state in conditions of globalisation, an issue which i  particularly relevant in the
context of this panel.   Let me first make it clear that I do not accept the reformist
conventional wisdom that the nation state is losing all its authority either to supranational
institutions or to subnational governments, important though both of these are.   To give an
anecdotal example, I spent considerable time recently carefully reading the ‘Greenwich speech’
of the Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett.   This was not because of the location
in which it was delivered, but because I was advised by my superiors that it was as important
for the future of higher education in this country as the ‘Woolwich speech’ delivered by
Crosland in 1965 which announced the binary divide.    If one is involved in the business of
7education, or the provision of health services, the nation state remains an important (and
increasingly intrusive) actor.
Baker, Gamble and Seawright (1999) suggest that three perspectives are useful in assessing
the relevance of the debate on globalisation to the British case.   ‘The proponents of hyper-
globalisation argue that the changes introduced by globalisation are so profound that they have
altered profoundly the political economy context of national policy-making.’  (p.5).    I have
never been particularly convinced by the ‘borderless world’ thesis.   One of its most vigorous
proponents has been Ohmae who informed us that ‘During 1988 nearly 90 per cent of all
Japanese honeymooners went abroad.  Facts of these kinds are hard to ignore.’  (Ohmae,
1990, p.19).  It can be argued with some confidence that it is possible to ignore them and the
whole permanently jet lagged, airport bookstall hyper globalist school.
The national political economy perspective ‘defends the continuing viability of social
democracy and other national economic policy regimes  ... The world economy is still an
international economy rather than a global economy.’  (Baker, Gamble and Seawright, 1999,
p.7).   This perspective deserves to be taken seriously, but it may overstate the authority and
room for manoeuvre of the nation state.   This experience of the ‘Rover affair’ illustrates how
few options it may have.
The perspective I find myself closest to is that of ‘open regionalism’ (Baker, Gamble and
Seawright, 1999, p.9).   Its main elements are:
1. A rejection of the more extreme formulations of the hyper globalists and a recognition
that nation-states remain important actors.
82. The changes represented by globalisation, particularly those in the financial markets,
are real changes which have altered the context for national economic policy making.
3. The central importance of the process of European integration.  The term open
regionalism is deployed because entities such as the EU are not old fashioned
protectionist blocs.   They form part of a wider system of governance and regulation of
the global economy, but they do facilitate the creation of a new political space.
The EU’s contradictory position in relation to globalization
The EU is beset with a fundamental contradiction in that it is both a facilitator of globalisation
and endeavours to offer social protection against its worst effects.  The creation of a single
market and a single currency makes it easier for multinational companies to organise their
production on a Europe wide basis and to seek to capture a large share of the European
market.    One perspective advanced within the Commission has been to see ‘globalization as
an opportunity rather than a threat: a force for the creation of employment rather than a
danger to jobs within the EU.’ (Rosamond, 1999, p.665).
However, as Rosamond emphasises, there are ‘potentially many “globalizations” at work
within the EU polity.’  (Rosamond, 1999, p.667).   The notion of a ‘social Europe’ is an
important one, a protected space in which an effort is made to tackle problems such as ‘social
exclusion’.    Somewhat perversely, the EU has been most successful (at a considerable
financial and opportunity cost) in creating a protected space for its farmers, a marginal and
declining group.   The farmers who have benefitted most from the CAP have been those who
are already wealthy.   There are signs, however, that under the umbrella of ‘multifunctionality’
the terms of the debate are shifting towards the creation of a more inclusive rural policy which
9would nevertheless require protection against the more rabid antipodean demands for
complete trade liberalisation in agriculture.
Nevertheless, there are tensions between the vision of a ‘social Europe’ and demands for the
effective integration of the EU in the global economy, tensions perhaps reflected in the value
of the euro against the dollar.   These tensions are particularly relevant to consideration of the
British case.   It is evident that Tony Blair favours an American model in terms of flexible
labour markets.  He has reasserted his view that Europe needs to take a fresh direction in its
economic policy and ‘that there is a growing consensus that the European social model needs
revitalising.’  (Financial Times, 16 March 2000).  (Decoding hint: for ‘revitalising’, a hurrah
word, read ‘liberalising’ a boo word).  Some progress was made in this direction at the Lisbon
summit and subsequent meetings.    There are still limits, however, in the extent to which
France and Germany are prepared to move towards more liberal labour markets and the
momentum within the EU is towards the creation of new social rights for workers.
The fundamental issue here has, of course, been well put by Polanyi: labour cannot be treated
just as a commodity.   Labour ‘is the technical term used for human beings, in so far as they
are not employers but employed’.   (Polanyi, 1944, p.75).   As he argues, ‘the alleged
commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused,
without affecting also the human individual who happens to the bearer of this particular
commodity.’  (Polanyi, 1944, p.73).   Can a global economy permit the construction of a
morally determined space in which the human being as employee is p r itted certain rights
and protections?   Or does its logic confine both the EU and member states to a mopping up
operation for the socially excluded who are at least in part the victims of economic forces
beyond their control?   New Labour’s answer would be to give them more responsibility for
their fate by equipping them with the skills required in a rapidly changing economy.
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If what New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ offers is a compromise between ‘old fashioned’ social
democracy rendered redundant by the forces of globalisation, and the quiescent acceptance of
all its consequences by neo-liberals, then one test is whether it is able to offer individuals an
adequate protective covering which allows them to retain their dignity.
Big business and its representative structures: the triumph of the company state?
Before we consider how New Labour has chosen to construct its understanding of
globalisation, let us review the political representation of big business.   In earlier work, I have
advanced three models of business-government relations: the company state; the associative
state; and the party state.   (Grant, 1993, pp.13-17).  The last model, which relies on factions
of a dominant party mediating between the state and business interests, was seen as unlikely to
survive in the long run and inherently prone to corruption.   It has effectively disappeared in
Italy and been undermined in Japan.
The associative state in which well organised and influential business associations mediate
between business and the state has deep structural and cultural roots in countries such as
Germany and will not be easily pushed aside by the forces of gloablization.   However, ‘the
long-run prediction [remains] that the company state model of business-government relations
will tend to become more important in the long run.’  (Grant, 1993, p.18).   In other words,
direct interactions between the company and the state, mediated by the company’s government
relations division, become of increasing importance.  When they fail to occur, or are confined
to ‘hints’ dropped  by the company, as in the BMW/Rover case, there’s trouble ahead.
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What is evident is that trade associations are facing increasing difficulties both at the European
and the national level.   At the EU level, direct contacts between companies and the
Commission have flourished, while in a number of key industries, federations of federations
have been replaced (or at least complemented) by direct membership associations organising
the leading firms.   There is something of a crisis of the traditional trade association in
Brussels.   As Nauwelaerts (1999, p.22) has observed, ‘globalisation and changing member
expectations are hitting European trade associations hard.’   As one government relations
director interviewed by the writer in Brussels in 1999 commented, ‘The classic business
associations [that] have been in Brussels for thirty years now face a challenge just as
traditional political parties face a challenge from the organisations of civil society.’
At the national level associations in mature industries are faced with the loss of members
through closures or mergers. The merged company may be controlled from outside Britain.
The international headquarters may be unwilling to pay national trade associations
subscriptions; the local subsidiary may be willing to do so, but have no budget line it can use.
The stripping out of middle management levels in companies means that there are fewer staff
available to serve on association committees.  Matters are not easier, however, in high tech
industries.  Small start-up firms may be difficult to recruit and retain and, in any case, their
subscriptions may not meet the cost of the services they require.   Increasingly, the role of
associations is to provide services at a fee, but in doing so they face commercial competitors
who may be able to offer a better price-quality mix.   The one special good they may be able to
offer their members is a ‘quality kitemark’, although even this may be open to challenge under
competition law.    The importance attached by the CBI to the Trade Association Forum
suggests a commitment to tackling the problems of trade associations which has often been
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absent in the past.  It seems that one remedy the CBI is recommending is that of mergers of
associations, a subject on which it has sponsored a report.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has emerged from the long darkness of the
Thatcher and Major years a much smaller organisation in terms of staff.  They can now all be
fitted into two floors of Centre Point (admittedly largely in open plan, IT oriented offices).
The organisation still faces the problem of ‘stifling breadth’, treading a difficult course
between offering political leadership to business and offending its members who have been
willing at various points in its history to exercise the option of ‘exit with voice’.   Its
hesitancies over the Euro illustrate this problem well.
Although the CBI is proud to have recently recruited ‘lastminute.com’, its heartland is really in
the ‘old economy’ rather than the ‘new economy’ of dot com companies.   It is to the CBI that
the companies of Britain’s shrinking manufacturing base turn as they struggle to succeed in the
context of a ‘strong’ (overvalued) pound.
The appointment of a director general from the membership (Digby Jones, the former chair of
the West Midlands region), while creating a certain frisson at Centre Point, may reassure the
membership that the CBI is still responsive to their concerns.
The CBI has entered the sunlit uplands again with the election of the Blair Government.    The
outgoing president commented, ‘the working relationship between this government and the
CBI is “probably closer than at any time in the last 25 years” - certainly closer than under the
Thatcher or Major governments.’  (Financial Times, 10 July 2000).  Consultation is close,
frequent and intense.   Concessions are often given, if less frequently publicised.
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Nevertheless, the CBI faces a dilemma in terms of the declining ability of government to
deliver what its members want.   As the director-general commented in a recent speech at
Centre Point, ‘The paradigm has fundamentally changed in the western democracies as we
enter the 21st century.  The power of politicians is waning.’
The Blair approach to globalisation
The Blair Government’s general perspective is to see globalisation as a challenge and an
opportunity rather than a threat.    Globalisation was a useful device that could be deployed as
part of the process of converting ‘old’ into ‘new’ Labour.   It made it possible to argue that
any government’s room for manoeuvre was limited and that powerful international financial
markets demand a market based philosophy.   As Hay and Watson argue (1999, p.155), ‘It is
the discursive construction of  globalization, rather than globalization per se which is driving
political change in contemporary Britain ... globalization acts as a convenient post hoc
rationalization for a logic of tax cutting which the Labour Party had already internalized.’
Blair’s analysis of globalisation started from the belief that:
The determining context of economic policy is the new global market.
That imposes huge limitations of a practical nature ... on macroeconomic
policies (Financial Times, 22 May 1995)
Given that Blair apparently views globalisation as both a normative and an empirical
imperative, what is there left for government to do in the sphere of economic policy?    The
prime minister elaborated his own views of what he saw as the three key tasks for ‘centre-left’
governments in his meeting with President Clinton in February 1998:
One was that, as a result of globalization, it was essential that domestic
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governments held to fiscal and monetary prudence.   Second, that there
was a role for government, but that was not in extensive economic
regulation but in empowerment with the equipment of the individual to
make the markets operate better.   Thirdly, that we have to construct a tax
and benefit system which was sound and helped to make work pay.
(Senior British Official, 1998, p.1).
None of these statements would be objectionable to a person holding a social market stance.
It is interesting how Blair uses the phrase ‘really successful businessman’ as an accolade of
high praise and how he has been keen to associate himself with entrepreneurs.   Much of this
has to do with the personal values of the prime minister rather than with globalisation which
offers a convenient justification for a stance he might well take in any case.   ‘One of the most
striking traits of Tony Blair is his reverence for big companies.   His empathy with professional
managers - especially the quasi-American model which throngs the CBI - is infinitely greater
than any fraternal bond with trade unionists.’  (Financial Times, 4 February 1998).
‘Although concerned at the rhetorical level with the promotion of social justice ... “New”
Labour is principally concerned with strengthening the power of capital ... Blair’s designated
image for his Labour Party is that it is a party for and of business’.  (Herffernan, 2000, p.73).
Even if there was no globalisation, Tony Blair would be predisposed to the company state.  He
made it clear before he was elected that he wanted to have a closer relationship with business:
People don’t even question for a moment that the Democrats are a pro-
business party.  They should not be asking that question about New
Labour.   New Labour is pro-business, pro-enterprise and we believe that
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there is nothing inconsistent between that and a just and decent society.
(Financial Times, 16 January 1997).
Even as concerns have been raised about the erosion of Labour support in the ‘heartlands’ (or
among ‘core’ voters in marginal seats), Tony Blair has stuck to his belief in a close working
relationship with business:
‘ ... sometimes people want me to adopt old-fashioned rhetoric.  Well, I
won’t.  I will say nothing other than what I believe, which is that I’m
delighted that we  have business people and entrepreneurs who can today
support the Labour party.  And I never ever want to see that situation
change again.’  (Financial Times,16 March 2000).
Rhetoric is, of course, cheap but it has been matched by the Government’s actions in the
sphere of economic policy.   Immediately after the election it was decided to give the Bank of
England’s monetary policy committee control over the setting of interest rates.   A key policy
lever was thus transferred away from the government to a setting more amenable to global
economic forces.   It is believed that monetary policy needs to be insulated from political
influence in a global economy.   Interestingly, John Major was against such a move on
democratic grounds, believing that the person setting interest rates should be directly
accountable to Parliament.   However, the imperative for the Blair Government was to
establish credibility with the markets.
On the fiscal front, the government’s policies have been marked by prudence.  New Labour
pledged that it would adhere to the spending commitments of its Conservative predecessors
for the first two years in office.   The Chancellor used his first budget to announce a deficit-
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reduction plan.   ‘Reminiscent of the first Thatcher Government’s medium-term financial
strategy ... the new Labour Government has instituted the first overtly “rules-based” policy in
Britain since the Thatcher Government ended its monetary targeting experiment in the early
1980s.’  (Hay and Watson, 1999, p.159-60).
The government has specified two key rules that in accordance with the principles of the new
fiscal framework seek to avoid a rise in the burden of public debt.   The ‘golden’ rule requires
that over the economic cycle, the government will borrow only to invest and not to fund
current spending.   The government will meet the golden rule if, on average over a complete
economic cycle, the current budget is in balance or surplus.   The sustainable investment rule
requires that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the economic
cycle at a stable and prudent level.  The government believes that, other things being equal, a
modest reduction in net public sector debt to below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle is
desirable.
The Chancellor has thus relinquished his control of monetary policy (although government still
sets the inflation target) and constrained his autonomy in relation to fiscal policy.   There are
those who argue that these constraints should be even tighter, but most analysts would regard
the conduct of fiscal policy as prudent.   As Hay and Watson comment (1999, p.158), ‘The
actions of New Labour in power point to the realization of the tendential depoliticization of
macroeconomic policy implicit in its neo-liberal rhetoric.’  Whether the rhetoric is actually
neo-liberal might be disputed, but it is certainly consistent with a social market stance.   As
Skidelsky notes (1999, p.287), ‘The economic policy model suggested by the [social market
approach] is one that combines a rule-based macroeconomic policy ... with the promotion of
flexible product and labour markets, and targeted investment in human capital.’  Such an
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approach certainly implies a measure of depoliticisation of economic policy, a theme that will
be returned to in the conclusion.
Happy days are here again?
For a big business person, the return of the Blair Government should have been a glad
morning indeed.   Britain had a government which many of them regarded as centre-right,
despite its styling itself as centre-left.   As one chief executive put it, ‘Businesses support
centre-right policies.  This [Labour government] is a centre-right government.’  (Financial
Times, 8 November 1997).   More recently, Digby Jones, the new CBI director-general has
said that ‘he shared the same “centre-right” political ground with the government.’  (Financial
Times, 17 November 1999).  Indeed, it was argued that it was the most pro-big business
government that Britain had ever had.    The Government has shown itself willing to make
concessions to business on a wide range of issues from the union recognition law to climate
change reduction taxes (although there has been some business disappointment about the
outcome in that area).
This does not mean, however, that the relationship has been entirely free of tensions.   Leaving
aside the question of the high value of pound and membership of the Euro, where business
itself cannot decide what is in its best interests, there are two main areas of tension.   One
arises from the suspicion that the government is prone to ‘regulation by stealth’.   The other
arises from conflicts between non-economic areas of government policy and the objectives of
business.   By the time of the budget in March 2000 there were signs of a more general
worsening of the relationship between government and business.
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Despite the 1980s being hailed as the era of deregulation, in practice it was often a period of
reregulation.   All modern governments face pressures to ‘do something’ about problems in
society.   There is thus ‘a tendency for statism and bureaucracy to creep back “pragmatically”,
in response to particular “shocks” liable to provoke the hysteria of the media and as a
consequence a public demand that “something be done”’.  (Skidelsky, 1999, p.280).   ‘Tough
new measures’ are then announced which increase the regulatory burden.
One may put this more formally in the following terms.   Risk averseness varies across
individuals in society.   However, those who are particularly risk averse (for example, on food
safety issues) are likely to combine with others in pressure groups to secure a desired
reduction of risk.   Given that concentrated pressures tend to outweigh diffuse preferences,
government’s line of least resistance is to respond  positively to demands for more regulation.
This is particularly attractive given that regulation generally places a relatively low burden on
the public finances compared to other measures and may even generate revenue.   The costs of
compliance are borne by the regulated and are generally not very visible and easy to calculate.
Thus one ends up with an outcome which is more risk restraining than would be the outcome
of the simple aggregation of individual preferences.    There may be a net welfare loss if one
believes that a successful and thriving society requires some relatively unrestrained risk takers.
This propensity to regulate is reinforced by an emphasis on its virtues in some of the Third
Way literature.   Giddens (1998, p.20) has argued that what he terms ‘the new mixed
economy’ refers ‘to a balance between regulation and deregulation; and between the economic
and the non-economic in the life of the society.’  If one looks at the grounds for regulation that
he sets out they are potentially very extensive.   Moreover, Wolf has argued (1999) that the
indirect exercise of state power through regulation may actually enhance the efficiency of the
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control exercised by the cor state.  The regulatory temptation is thus an attractive one for
government.
By the time of its 1999 conference the CBI was complaining publicly about the ‘crippling
burden’ of regulation.   The CBI president, Sir Clive Thompson, listed twenty-two laws and
regulations ranging from working time regulations to the Data Protection Act that had
contributed to higher business costs and lower flexibility.  (Financial Times, 2 November
1999).   One might dismiss this as typical business rhetoric about government ‘interference’,
but it does represent a real underlying concern.
The government has to address audiences other than business and some of the policies it has
developed have brought it into conflict with business interests.  The prime example was the
‘rip off Britain’ campaign which claimed that British consumers were having to pay more for
goods and services than their counterparts in other countries.    Retailers who have taken the
brunt of the campaign were particularly aggrieved claiming that ‘It does look a bit like old
fashioned business bashing.’  (Financial Times, 28 September 1999).   Following pressure
from the CBI, and some criticism from ministers outside the Department of Trade and
Industry, it was made known in October 1999 that the campaign would be toned down.
At around the same time the government was involved in a public row with leading
pharmaceutical companies over the decision by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE) to ban the new flu treatment Relenza from the NHS.  If better value for money is to be
delivered in the NHS, a central government objective, one way of doing that is controlling
drug costs.   However, pharmaceuticals is a research intensive industry and the companies
would argue that they need to recover their investment.  From their perspective, ‘The
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emergence of NICE as a new obstacle to market entry serves to wipe out, at a stroke, a key
element of the UK’s competitive advantage in the global pharmaceutical industry.’   The open
letter sent to the Prime Minister by the British Pharma Group representing the (then) three
British-based multinational pharmaceutical companies bluntly stated that the Relenza decision
‘has potentially devastating consequences for the future of the British-based pharmaceutical
industry.’   (Financial Times, 6 October 1999).   The government response was to dismiss this
row as a little local difficulty.   A DTI adviser commented:
... this is a very specific issue.   It is not about the relationship between
government and business more generally.    That relationship is good,
especially compared to previous Labour governments, and with the Tories.
(Financial Times, 7 October 1999).
Nevertheless, there were increasing signs that the political honeymoon between government
and business was coming to an end.   The new director-general of the CBI set out a policy
programme in January 2000 which indicated a more combative approach to government
compared with that of his predecessor, the emollient Adair Turner who had built up a close
relationship with ministers.   Unlike his predecessors, both of whom had a connection with the
management consultants McKinsey, Digby Jones was a businessman with a reputation as a
corporate dealmaker who had served as chair of the CBI’s Midlands region.   He listed
demonstrating independence from government as one of his main priorities.  ‘I don’t believe
that the perception that we have been too close to government is something that CBI members
want.   I don’t want to be cosy with government.’   (Financial Times, 29 March 2000).
Personalities can matter as well as structures.
Business and the Blair Government in conflict
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The Chancellor’s 2000 budget, although widely seen as a political success, was preceived by
business as too oriented towards winning the next election by meeting the concerns of
Labour’s core supporters (and those of ‘middle England’).   There was concern about the re-
emergence of ‘old Labour’ tendencies as ministers sought to placate party factions.  Business
circles saw the government as having turned away from business.  There was particular
disappointment at the small additional sum allocated to transport infrastructure which is a
particular concern of the CBI.     The CBI’s director-general commented, ‘I would not call this
the Budget for business that we were hoping for.’
(Financial Times, 22 March 2000).   The Financial Times concluded, ‘business leaders are
rapidly losing trust in ministers who were regarded as a welcome change from their discredited
Conservative predecessors.’
On 29 March the Financial Times ran a headline story, Honeymoon over, business leaders
warn Labour.’    The director general of the increasingly influential British Chambers of
Commerce stated:
I think business attitudes may well have reached a watershed.    There is
growing disllusionment with this government’s pro-business credibility.
There is a growing feeling that they are not hearing us.  They listen, but
they do not hear.  (Financial Times, 29 March 2000).
The Government’s response showed some of the uncertainity and confusion that came to
characterise its performance on the following months.   On the one hand, there was an
immediate (and probably coincidental) announcement of a Business Coordination Unit in the
Privy Council Office, run by a senior civil servant with the leader of the house (and former
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DTI minister) Margaret Beckett in charge.    The task of the unit was to coordinate shop floor
visits and improve lines of communication with industrial leaders.
However, there was also an insistence that there was not really a problem, or if there was one,
it was to do with individuals such as Digby Jones and Chris Humphries who found themselves
the subject of attention from the spin doctors.   There was a view in government circles that,
while small businesses might be electorally quite significant, winning the support of big
business was less important now that Gordon Brown had established New Labour’s
credentials for fiscal stability.   There was thus an inclination to play hard ball.   In the run up
to the CBI conference at which Tony Blair was scheduled to speak, a quote from a ‘senior
government member’ appeared more than once in the press: ‘There is a feeling that business is
behaving increasingly like any other pressure group.   Well, if that is how they want to play it,
that is how they will be treated.’  (Financial Times, 18 May 2000).
The Blair speech was trailed as a shot across business’s bows.   The Financial imes, used by
both sides to put their case, carried a front p ge story ‘Blair to warn business on its influence.’
(Financial Times, 16 May 2000).   ‘Tony Blair will signal to business leaders  tonight that the
government has broader priorities than appeasing its growing ranks of critics in the business
community.’   However, the warning signal never came.   The speech ‘veered between
apology and defiance.’   (Financial Times, 18 May 2000).   The most plausible interpretation
is that a decision was taken a few hours before the dinner to tone down the speech so as not to
raise the temperature.
Other events, however, served to raise it.   Just before the March budget, Tony Blair held one
of his occasional meetings with the Multinational Chairmen’s Group, one of the less well
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known  but most influential groups within British business politics (it meets under the auspices
of the CBI).   They were reassured by what they heard. When the budget was delivered, it
included a bombshell for multinational companies.  Multinationals minimise their tax bills on
profits repatriated by countries with low tax rates by ‘mixing’ them with profits from higher
tax countries to low the amount due to the British tax authorities.   The Chancellor announced
that he was going to outlaw mixing and in future a British tax rate of 30% would apply.
Estimates of the cost to multinationals varied widely, but the figure was probably in the
billions rather than the £300 million projection of the Inland Revenue.
Some of the initial estimates were, nevertheless, exaggerated and irritated the Treasury.  The
professional services and accounting firm, PwC, was particularly vociferous in its complaints.
The Chancellor went on Breakfast with Frost to attack the leader of the PwC campaign
personally, pointing out that he had once advised the disgraced Conservative minister, Neil
Hamilton.    The result was a new low in relations between business and the Treasury with
business people attacking named Treasury officials and praising others and the Treasury, who
had felt left out of the loop by ministers, attacking political appointees who were felt to lack
political judgement.   The CBI sought to mediate with Digby Jones having a long meeting with
Tony Blair to find a solution which would not lead to the impression that the Chancellor was
being overruled by the Prime Minister or forced to back down by multinational companies.
The only concession the Government would offer was a nine month delay which left business
leaders deeply disappointed.
Further difficulties were caused by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill which gives the
security services the right to intercept E mails.   Business criticisms of the cost of
implementation alarmed Downing Street and they offered a contribution of £20 million.   This
24
was not enough to save the Government from defeat in the House of Lords which voted for
‘fair’ compensation in July 2000.
One other area of tension deserves mention.   The Scottish Parliament and the Welsh
Assembly and their executives are perceived as less ‘business friendly’ than London based
institutions.   Fewer than a dozen of Scotland’s 129 MSPs have business backgrounds with
most of the members being former councillors, trade unionists and public sector workers.
This is a particular concern in Edinburgh because of its importance as a financial centre.   The
decoupling of Scottish business rates from those elsewhere in Britain upset business interests.
In June 2000 five organisations formed a new structure to lobby ministers jointly on behalf of
business (CBI Scotland; the Institute of Directors in Scotland; Scottish Chambers of
Commerce; Scottish Council Development and Industry; and Scottish Financial Enterprise).
Devolved government makes it more difficult for Tony Blair to deliver on his pledges to
business.
Conclusions
The principal conclusion of this paper is that the Labour Government’s understanding of
globalisation is constructed in the mind of Tony Blair (and other key actors such as Anthony
Giddens).   If there is no G, Tony would still be well disposed to BB (big business).   His
overall stance was succinctly stated in a speech to American financiers (who else?) in New
York in 1998.  After he had expressed his delight at appearing in front of such a ‘distinguished
group of people’ in a ‘great city’ he stated:
... the new Labour Government attaches enormous importance to its
relations with business both here and in the UK and abroad.   The
importance we attach not just to developing close links with British
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business but also with business abroad is demonstrated by the degree with
which we want to go out and have a proper dialogue with business and be
the natural party of business.  (writer’s italics).   We believe that is what
we should be.   The days when business and government had a difficult
relationship are largely over, but we want to build now a relationship for
the long term that really works.  (10 Downing Street Newsroom, 14 April
1998).
One could commend the political realism of this stance in an era of globalisation and the
company state.   One could also say that a variety of political responses to the phenomenon we
know as ‘globalisation’ is possible.   Business is a difficult client to satisfy and there are new
signs of tension in its relationship with new Labour.  Labour also has to be responsive to other
clienteles, not least because it wants to be re-elected with a solid majority.   Tensions between
‘the politics of support’ and the ‘politics of power’ start to arise (to use Andrew Gamble’s
terminology) and may even infect the key relationship between the prime minister and
chancellor.   Seeing how these tensions play out is almost as fascinating as watching a good
football match.
Blair came close to confronting business in May 2000, but backed away.  Instead there has
been a renewed emphasis on offering concessions to business.   An increasingly tarnished
government cannot risk a major rift with business, having placed so much emphasis on the
importance of its support.   On the business side, there is likely to be a reluctance to sacrifice
the new ‘privileged’ insider status.   However, as Sir Clive Thompson commented when he
stood down as CBI president:
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The danger is being over-flattered by sitting around the table with
Government and the CBI was flattered by the buzz of working with
ministers.   But that does not mean that you are fulfilling your duty to the
membership.    The membership is more interested in what the outcome is.
It has been a wonderful experience but the question is how successful have
we been and I think we had mixed success.  (Th  Independent, 10 July
2000).
As far as least some business persons are concerned, the concessions the CBI has won on the
minimum wage and the working time directive are outweighed by the legitimacy it has given to
the new laws.    However, there might be less concern about the regulatory burden if the
pound was not so overvalued and the Government gave a clearer leader on the euro (although
business is by no means united on this issue).
Some of the most important changes in structures and processes may take place at a
transantional level.    The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (part of the US-EU summit
mechanism) is a significant new development which potentially increases the influence of chief
executives of major companies based on either side of the Atlantic.  It is the subject of
research in progress with David Coen at London Business School.
It may be suggested that the trends outlined here are consistent with the depoliticisation thesis
advanced by Peter Burnham.   He draws attention to a ‘new politics of restructuring in terms
of the shift from politicised to depoliticised forms of state management of labour power and
money’.  (Burnham, 1999, p.38).   He sees depoliticisation as a governing strategy in Britain
taking three main forms: shift of tasks from government to ‘non-political’ bodies as a means of
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underwriting credibility; measures to externally validate policy; and the adoption of binding
‘rules’ which limit government room for manoeuvre.    It is possible even for an
unreconstructed Weberian to see value added in Burnham’s perspective without approaching
it within the terms of ‘a particular reading of Marx.’  (Burnham, 1999, p.51).
A ready and willing acceptance of globalisation as a driver for change is part of a Blairite
world view which is and should be open to challenge and critical debate.  Part of that debate
should be continuing reflection about the form the relationship between government and
business should take.   There is much to be said for an effective working partnership, provided
it is a genuine partnership and not a relationship in which the values and preferences of one
partner dominates.  Although British politics, and economic policy in particular, still operates
within the general terms of a new political settlement constructed after 1979, no one can say at
the beginning of the century what the political configuration will be even ten years hence.
That is what makes politics an interesting but also a difficult subject of study.
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